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Abstract
The early phases of syntactic acquisition are characterized by many input fre-
quency and item effects, which argue against theories assuming innate access
to classical syntactic categories. In formulating an alternative view, we con-
sider both prototype and exemplar-learning models of categorization. We ar-
gue for a ‘hybrid’ usage-based view in which acquisition depends on exemplar
learning and retention, out of which permanent abstract schemas gradually
emerge and are immanent across the summed similarity of exemplar collec-
tions. These schemas are graded in strength depending on the number of exem-
plars and the degree to which semantic similarity is reinforced by phonological,
lexical, and distributional similarity.
1. Introduction
If we are interested in the nature of linguistic representations, an important
source of information is how such representations are built up during the pro-
cess of language acquisition. In the domain of syntax, there are basically two
types of theoretical account of how this happens. Firstly, linguistic formalists/
‘representational’ nativists assume that many of the most important linguistic
representations are given biologically and do not need to be built up – they
‘just’ need to be connected (linked) to the particular language being learned.
The assumption is that underlying linguistic competence is a symbolic com-
putational system that processes the relationships between abstract variables,
which are basically all-or-none in nature (e.g., Chomsky 1995; Marcus 1998).
1. Many thanks to Alan Yu, Caroline Rowland, Danielle Matthews, Franklin Chang, Elena
Lieven and two anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments and suggestions.
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Thus, syntactic categories in this approach are classical categories that are de-
fined by the presence or absence of certain defining features.
Secondly, theorists from a more usage-based or emergentist perspective be-
lieve that an individual’s linguistic representations are built up through mecha-
nisms that are not limited to the linguistic domain, which act on individual us-
age events of linguistic comprehension and production (e.g., Tomasello, 2003;
Elman et al. 1996; MacWhinney 1999; Goldberg 1999, 2006). Experience with
each exemplar contributes to linguistic competence, though the precise nature
of this contribution is characterized differently in different accounts.
In the current article we argue, first, that approaches that rely on a priori,
classical categories in their descriptions of linguistic competence are incom-
patible with the many asymmetries, frequency, and item effects observed dur-
ing the early acquisition of a variety of grammatical structures. In contrast,
a usage-based account (e.g., Tomasello 2003) expects exactly these kinds of
acquisition patterns and effects. The key issue in a usage-based approach is
how children make generalizations beyond item-based schemas and construc-
tions. Therefore, our main attempt here is to specify a model of generaliza-
tion/abstraction processes in early grammatical development. We believe that
one crucial set of mechanisms in grammatical generalization are categorization
processes. A major point of contention within the categorization literature in
general is whether learners develop abstractions that supersede (and essentially
efface) the experienced exemplars, as in a ‘pure’ version of prototype theory
or, alternatively, whether generalization occurs solely through online analogi-
cal comparison to a set of previously learned exemplars. We opt in the end for
a kind of hybrid model comprising both abstractions and the retention of the
exemplars of which those abstractions are composed.
2. Item effects and the inadequacy of classical categories
The central idea behind linguistic nativism (a form of representational na-
tivism) is that children just need to ‘link in’ to the a-priori categories and this
results in a rapid acquisition of syntactic rules. Thus, the assumption of lin-
guistic nativists is that if a child applies a symbolic rule to one member of
a category, she should apply it to all other members equally and at the same
time (e.g., Radford 1990: 61; Marcus 1998: 250). However, this prediction
is not borne out by the data from acquisition. A large number of studies have
found that in the initial stages of multiword speech of children’s production and
comprehension of linguistic constructions tends to be based around particular
words which frequently occur in these in the input (see Tomasello 2003, for a
review). One especially clear example is the acquisition of WH-questions. Four
year-old English children have been found to make many more non-inversion
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errors when asking questions beginning with What do . . .? than with What does
. . .? (Ambridge et al. 2005). That is, English-speaking children are not learning
“WH-word AUXILIARY SUBJECT . . . ?” as an ordering of abstract categories
of elements, but rather they are learning patternings of particular words such
as what and does. Moreover, children’s rate of error is determined mainly by
the frequency of particular WH-words-auxiliary combinations (e.g., what can
. . .?, where is . . .?) in the linguistic input and whether they themselves have
previously frequently produced these particular item based-patterns (Rowland
and Pine 2000; Rowland 2005).
The most extensive evidence for initial item-based usage comes from English-
speaking children’s acquisition of SVO word order in the transitive construc-
tion involving action verbs. English-speaking children around 24 months, who
use active transitive utterances frequently every day with familiar verbs that
they have heard being used as transitives, have difficulty applying the transitive
SVO pattern to novel verbs (e.g., Tomasello and Brooks 1998; see Tomasello
2000, 2003, for a review), and they are no better in act-out comprehension tasks
(Chan et al. 2005).
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that English two-year-olds pass through
a stage in which they even inconsistently categorize novel causative verbs
within the same task. For example, in the ‘weird word order’ paradigm of
Akhtar (1999), children heard novel verbs modeled for novel events. One was
modeled in canonical English SVO order and others in ungrammatical SOV or
VSO orders. When the children had heard a novel verb in either the SOV or
VSO frames, the four-year-olds corrected to SVO 96 % of the time – showing
that children this age indeed do apply the SVO pattern to all members of the
causative verb category. But the two-year-olds (mean age of 32 months) wa-
vered between using the novel verbs in the weird orders they had heard and
correcting them to SVO (circa 50 % of the time). Younger two-year-olds show
even greater willingness to use ungrammatical orders with the novel verbs.
Using intransitives (SV and VS order for self-initiated actions), Abbot-Smith,
Lieven and Tomasello (2001) found that English 28-month-olds used ungram-
matical word orders in 69 % of their utterances with novel verbs but in only
34 % of their utterances with a familiar verb.
These ‘weird word order’ studies also found evidence for pronoun-specific
usage. When the children in Abbot-Smith et al.’s study matched the non-canon-
ical order, they virtually never used a pronoun (see also Akhtar 1999; Matthews
et al. 2005). Conversely, when they corrected familiar and/or novel verbs to
canonical order, they used pronouns much more often than nouns. Similarly,
Dodson and Tomasello (1998) found that when children aged between 29 and
37 months used arguments with a novel verb which they had only heard used
without arguments, these arguments were pronouns 90 % of the time. In con-
trast, when children heard a novel verb used with arguments, they used pro-
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nouns in their own production significantly less – only 67 % of the time (see
also Childers and Tomasello 2001). Thus, English-speaking two-year-olds are
apparently aware that pronouns referring to an agent/subject precede and do
not follow the word denoting the action (i.e., verb, predicate) and find it easier
to access such patterns to generate novel utterances.
Crucially, in these item-based learning phases, the particular items to which
children apply a particular syntactic pattern correctly tend to be those which are
heard in this pattern most frequently in the input. An illustration of this can be
seen in the ‘weird word order’ study by Matthews et al. (2005) in which English
33-month-olds corrected highly frequent transitive verbs such as push and pull
to SVO word order significantly more often than transitive verbs of medium
frequency (e.g., shove and drag) or of low frequency (e.g., ram and tug) (see
Matthews, Theakston, Lieven and Tomasello, submitted, for similar findings
for French children). This mirrors findings for the acquisition of English past
tense morphemes, where it appears that the more frequently a particular irregu-
lar verb is heard with a particular past tense form (higher token frequency), the
more it becomes entrenched and consequently the more protected it is from er-
ror (e.g., Marchman 1997; Maslen et al. 2004). On the flip side, the higher type
frequency with which young children hear a particular morpheme or syntactic
construction, the more likely they appear to be to (over)generalize the pattern.
MacWhinney (1978), for example, notes that German children tend to over-
generalize the past tense suffix associated with the verb class with the highest
type frequency (-t, e.g., gespielt ‘played’) and not the one associated with the
verb class with the highest token frequency (-en, e.g., geschlafen ‘slept’).
This perspective on the acquisition of regular versus irregular morphology
is of course quite different from the symbolic-rule (regular morpheme) versus
rote-learned lexical item (irregular morpheme) view held by linguistic nativist
researchers such as Pinker (1998) and Marcus (1998), who claim that the rule
(the regular form) should be applied in all default contexts regardless of its
frequency. In fact, the type frequency of the morpheme or syntactic pattern is
not the only determinant of the likelihood with which it will be generalized
to a particular item. Rather, the phonological (e.g., Köpcke 1998) or semantic
(e.g., Ramscar 2002) similarity between the novel item and other items with
which that particular pattern has previously been learned has been found to
play a crucial role in the generalization of both so-called regular and irregular
morphemes even for adults (see Dabrowska 2004: Chapter 8, for more in-depth
discussion).
These findings of initial item-based and frequency-based development in the
application of syntactic generalizations appear to conflict with ‘symbolic rule
+ abstract variable’ approach of most linguistic nativist theorists. It is true that
certain recent linguistic nativist theories emphasize the role of lexical learning.
However, what most apparently mean by this is that lexical learning is required
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to trigger the acquisition of a particular feature, such as finiteness (e.g., Clah-
sen, Eisenbeiss and Penke 1996). Once triggering has occurred, however, the
rule should be applied universally to all items in the category. This would not
predict item-based usage or frequency effects within a particular category once
the child has started to apply the rule correctly for certain members of that
category. Admittedly, other recent linguistic nativist theories refer to the ac-
quisition of features which are associated with lexemes, such as the copula or
the auxiliary DO (e.g., Santelmann et al. 2002). But even this type of formal-
ist account would not predict early lexical specificity in the sense of syntactic
rules based around particular forms of one and the same lexeme (e.g., ‘do and
not does) or particular WH-word+person/tense auxiliary forms and not others.
Usage-based theorists, on the other hand, argue explicitly that children initially
pass through item-based phases and that frequency affects linguistic represen-
tations at all points in development. To take one example, Tomasello (1992)
argues that young English-speaking two-year-olds initially know how to mark
the verb participant roles for familiar verbs (e.g., English children know that
the ‘pusher’ comes before the verb push, and the ‘pushee’ follows it), but this
knowledge is not generalized to other verbs.
3. Psychologically plausible models of categorization in grammatical ac-
quisition
Emergentist and usage-based theorists argue that children gradually general-
ize over these item-based patterns through a variety of mechanisms including
categorization mechanisms (e.g., Tomasello 2003; Goldberg 2006). That cate-
gorization is involved in some areas of grammatical acquisition is indisputable
– all theories agree that children have to learn grammatical categories. But there
are at least two issues here on which the usage-based view differs from that of
linguistic nativists. Firstly, in usage-based theory syntactic categories are cer-
tainly not classical categories. Secondly, categorization is also involved in the
generalization of morphemes or sentence-level constructions to novel words
(e.g., Langacker 2000).
To date usage-based theory on how categorization works in grammatical de-
velopment has not been fleshed out to a great degree. Categorization in the
non-linguistic domain has been extensively investigated, which is why we look
to these studies for a potential model for grammatical categorization. Currently,
theoretical views within the literature on non-linguistic categorization can be
divided into two extremes: at the one end, the ‘pure’ prototype formation view
and at the other a ‘pure’ exemplar category/instance-learning model. The con-
cept of a prototype was developed through psycholinguistic research by Rosch
and colleagues (e.g., Rosch 1973; Rosch and Mervis 1975), partly as a reac-
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tion to the classical view of categories as being definitively bounded/linearly
separable and where individual items within that category must all contain the
same attributes or features. These authors established the following empiri-
cal phenomena, which do not fit with the classical categories view, regarding
how people categorize naturally-occurring or man-made objects. Firstly, not
all members of such categories share all the same features. Rather, the mem-
bers have a family-resemblance relationship to each other, whereby one may
share one or several features with another member but not with all members.
Secondly, not all members of these categories have equal status. Instead, some
items are more typical of a particular category than are others, in that they
contain more of the features associated with that particular category. Because
of this, these categories are graded with fuzzy boundaries so that they are not
necessarily linearly separable from other categories. That is, there is no obvi-
ous way to determine to which category marginal members belong simply by
comparing features or behavior.
A number of linguists have since presented evidence that syntactic categories
also exhibit the same prototype phenomena (e.g., Croft and Cruse 2004; Taylor
1995). We do not have the space to survey this evidence here. However, one
example is the distinction between passive participles and adjectives in English
and German. Classic linguistic tests for adjectival status include the possibility
of using the prefix un- , the possibility of occurring in pre-noun position, and
semantic reference to the state of an entity. Tests for transitive participle status
include the possibility of occurring in an active transitive and co-occurrence
with a by-phrase. However, many adjectives fail one or more of the ‘adjective’
tests (e.g., *the un-black/un-alone dog) and some transitive participles pass
both but can also be used with a by-phrase (e.g., the un-washed boy; the boy
is being washed by his mother). In German, un-prefixation and a von-phrase
(by-phrase) occasionally occur with the same participle within the same stative
passive utterance (see, e.g., Lenz 1993).
To account for such phenomena, many researchers in the non-linguistic cat-
egorization literature have argued that people abstract a mental representation,
which has the typical functional and perceptual features associated with that
particular category. Although this schema is abstracted over the features shared
by learned exemplars, in the ‘pure’ versions of prototype theory, the memory
traces for these learned exemplars decay with time, so that their more individ-
ual characteristics are lost and not used for the categorization of new items.
Instead, new items are categorized by direct comparison with the abstract pro-
totype. Some evidence for this view comes from experiments in which adults
and infants appear to find ‘prototypical’ items, which they have never seen, as
familiar as – or occasionally even more familiar than – actual training items, es-
pecially after a delay of a week (e.g., Strauss 1979; Homa, Sterling and Trepel
1981).
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An alternative body of opinion views categorization as instance learning
(see Chandler 2002, for a review). Instance learning theorists point to a va-
riety of evidence for faster processing of familiar exemplars even when the
familiar items are atypical (e.g., Brooks 1987). Secondly, the processing of
new instances cannot be accounted for entirely in terms of comparison with
a completely abstract prototype, because learners are sometimes more likely
to respond accurately to new exemplars when these share a greater number of
features with a particular learned exemplar which is itself actually quite dis-
tant from the prototype than they are to respond accurately to new exemplars
which are closer to the prototype but which share less features with any par-
ticular learned exemplar (e.g., Whittlesea 1987). These two characteristics of
non-linguistic categorization clearly tie in with findings that early usage of
sentential constructions are based around items such as frequent pronouns or
particular WH-word + auxiliary forms.
Even more crucial evidence in favor of exemplar models are a number of
automated purely instance-learning computational models which can simulate
both empirical prototype phenomena and account for the evidence of instance
learning (e.g., Nosofsky 1992; Hintzman 1986; Skousen 1992). Such models
can simulate prototype effects by, for example, retrieving training items in par-
allel and ‘summing’ the similarity between the features (e.g., Medin and Schaf-
fer 1978; Nosofsky 1992). From this, many have concluded that it is not neces-
sary to postulate the abstraction of a permanent prototype representation at all.
The same conclusion has been reached by a few researchers in grammatical ac-
quisition who have claimed that child grammatical productivity occurs solely
through online analogical comparison to a set of previously learned exemplars
(e.g., Ninio 2003).
4. Towards a usage-based model
In view of the prevalence of item-based effects and frequency effects in syntac-
tic acquisition (and which remain to some degree in adult language usage, see
Dabrowska 2004), exemplar models of categorization are more attractive than
a ‘pure’ prototype-abstraction model in which the extraneous details of original
instances are completely lost. Furthermore, such exemplar-learning models are
perhaps better able than pure prototype models to explain patterns of family
resemblance in syntactic and morphological categories where there is no cen-
tral tendency (e.g., Bybee 1995). However, we would question the assumption
that more abstract prototype categories are only generalized online and leave
no permanent representational change. Even in exemplar models every time an
exemplar is comprehended, its representation must change in some way, even
if this merely involves registering frequency. If the comprehension or produc-
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tion of a novel utterance involves ‘summing over’ similar sets of exemplars, the
frequency with which a set is called upon probably also leaves a trace. There-
fore, if the mutual similarities of a particular collection of exemplars (such
as transitive sentences) are ’summed over’ regularly, we believe this is highly
likely to permanently change the user’s linguistic representations in some way
equivalent to the formation of some kind of more abstract representation.
A resolution to the drawbacks of both ‘pure’ prototype and ‘pure’ exemplar-
learning models is a hybrid in which much of the extraneous details of original
instances are retained but where some kind of more abstract schema is grad-
ually formed on the basis of these. It may of course prove difficult to empiri-
cally differentiate such a hybrid model from certain ‘pure’ exemplar-learning
models. The chief focus of our current concerns, however, is a more serious
problem which plagues all categorization models. That is, how does one deter-
mine exactly what the similarity features are which are required for the cate-
gorization of new items? This is not such a problem if we restrict ourselves to
examining grammatical categorization based on perceptual properties. Indeed,
this may be all that is required for the acquisition of some areas of grammar,
such as grammatical gender or the formation of English irregular past tense
classes (although see Ramscar 2002, for evidence that semantics may even be
involved here). Perceptual properties such as prosody must also contribute to
the acquisition of question versus declarative constructions. Moreover, if there
are salient perceptual cues associated with particular grammatical construc-
tions, this may assist children to acquire the constructions more quickly (see
e.g. Braine 1963). Some evidence supporting this comes from Childers and
Tomasello (2001), who trained English-speaking two-year-olds with a variety
of transitive sentences containing the pronouns he and it as in He’s swinging
it!; He’s turning it!. This led to twice the number of children extending this
construction to a novel verb than did training with variable nouns only in the
slots.
However, such perceptual and distributional cues are clearly not sufficient
for target-like acquisition of argument structure constructions. When it comes
to functional/semantic categories or other relational categories even exemplar
models implicitly invoke a similarity metric, which means that they must as-
sume an underlying similarity structure (e.g., Hampton 1997). One potential
solution is to propose that people construct relational and semantic categories
in order to make sense of the world and in order to communicate with one an-
other. Thus, even when children are processing and learning their very first ex-
emplars, they do so through particular non-linguistic and communicative biases
which constrain how they view the world and interpret the formal grammatical
patterns they are hearing. The first kind of constraint involves communicative
function. From around nine months, humans are possibly unique in their ability
to interpret the communicative intentions of others (e.g., Tomasello 2003); for
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example, they are well-equipped to interpret whether a particular utterance is
a question, imperative or declarative. The second kind of constraint involves
relational similarity within these functions; that is, whether the utterance refers
to an event, a process or state. Thirdly, the child’s interpretation of the utterance
is likely to be constrained by attentional and perceptual biases relating to cues
such as self perpetuated and/or goal directed action and causality which infants
are sensitive to long before they begin to comprehend multiword utterances
(e.g., Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello 1998; Csibra et al. 1999; Cohen and
Oakes 1993). Other aspects of events and processes which are likely to be par-
ticularly salient or of interest to young children are those involving movement,
location, state change, possession and time (e.g., Slobin 1985).
Naturally, merely arming ourselves with these functional and relational con-
straints – and allowing both exemplar storage and schema formation – does not
give us a full account of the data from grammatical acquisition. If we assume
exemplar retention, why do toddlers not rote-learn everything? Further, the
item-based effects do not relate to actual exemplars, as two-year-olds appear
easily able to generalize new lexemes to the ‘slots’. For example, young two-
year-olds are able to create novel sentences whereby they insert novel names
for objects into the slots of a familiar verb, such as put wuggy on there (e.g.,
Tomasello et al. 1997).
We argue that the reason for item-based rather than purely rote-learning
phases is the following. Every utterance a child hears and processes has a
lasting effect on linguistic representations; i.e., it is never completely ‘lost’
in that the representations completely revert to the state prior to having heard
the exemplars. However, a single specific token is unlikely to be recalled due
to insufficient phonological encoding and to interference from the many other
utterances which have been processed before and are processed subsequently.
Therefore, individual sentences will only be rote-learned if they are used by the
caregivers with extremely high frequency, such as What’s that? in English. The
majority of sentences that children hear are not exactly the same but overlap
to a very high degree in terms of certain lexical items, such as can you X? or
X put Y here (see Stoll, Abbot-Smith, and Lieven, submitted). Taking the latter
example, if a child hears and processes a large number of sentences involving
the verb put such as shall we put your picture here?, put it here!, you want to
put that on there?, these are likely to activate very similar patterns during pro-
cessing, because the event is essentially the same and the phonological form
put is the same, so the exemplars are thus – to express it in connectionist terms
– stored as ‘neighbors in state space’. However, the form your picture will be
overwritten or interfered with by the forms it and that from the other two ex-
emplars. Thus the remaining representation will essentially be something like
put X, where X stands for an object. From a process such as this, children
could learn to generalize put to new objects and essentially show the familiar
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verb-based learning phases found for early child English and French.
One potential problem with this view is, if we assume that one-year-olds
find elements of events such as causation and movement highly salient, why
do they not skip the item-based phase and immediately construct more general
schemas based on concepts such as “AGENT ACTION OBJECT”, as proposed
by several semantic primitives theorists in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Slobin
1985; Schlesinger 1988). We believe there are several reasons for this. Firstly,
if a child has only learned a relatively small number of exemplars concerning
a particular event or set of events, the crucial semantic features which correlate
with the formal features will not be immediately obvious. Moreover, there will
not yet have been enough overwriting of the more idiosyncratic elements of the
events concerned which are not directly relevant for the learning of argument
structure. In terms of being able to demonstrate productivity in a novel verb
experiment, initially sentences with familiar relational elements such as famil-
iar verbs should be much easier to categorize, because they show the greatest
degree of relational similarity to previously learned exemplars. As more and
more similar exemplars are learned, however, gradually the relational com-
monality between these events and relational lexemes will be reinforced, the
non-common elements being overwritten or interfered with. Through this lan-
guage learners reach a point in which novel verbs may be categorized (in this
case: generalized to) with equal success if the relational features of the event
they refer to match the summed similarity of the exemplar category set. Our
view is thus very close to that of Langacker (2000: 7) who claims that the more
abstract schema which emerges from the process of exemplar-learning (e.g.,
English NVN = ‘agent verb patient’) is not stored separately from the individ-
ual learned exemplars, but is rather ‘immanent’ in the sum of their similarities.
Exactly how abstract this ‘summed similarity’ (or schema, to use shorthand)
is will depend on the nature of the exemplars, the frequency with which new
items need to be categorized and the semantic or analogical distance between
the new instances and the previously learned exemplars.
Thus, the strength of a particular ‘more abstract’ prototype schema depends
on its level of entrenchment, which in turn depends on exactly how many ex-
emplars of that schema the child has processed (e.g., Bybee 1995; Tomasello
2003). The strength of the schema will gradually increase until it reaches the
point where it is strong enough to support a particular behavior or productivity
measure. Thus, if we see that at a certain point in development a child is able to
demonstrate productivity with a particular construction where she was not able
to do so before, we must assume that the schema for that particular construc-
tion has been gradually strengthening for some time beforehand. If we think
about this, this means that this schema must have been abstract in some sense
for some time before that child demonstrated productivity with it. Indeed, if we
take to its logical conclusion claims made by usage-based grammarians that an
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abstract schema is immanent in its instantiations (e.g., Langacker 2000), then
a potential abstract schema is latent in the first few item-based constructions
that share semantic and structural similarities. That is, from this point on, item-
based argument structure constructions are not really ‘based solely around lex-
ical items’, but are (weakly) interconnected with others which are semantically
and functionally related.
This idea that more abstract grammatical representations grow in strength
is extremely reminiscent of a theory developed by Munakata et al. (1997) to
explain discrepancies between looking and reaching measures within the do-
main of non-linguistic object permanence development. Munakata et al. argue
that the knowledge underlying infants’ behavior is best viewed as graded in
strength, depending on the number of exemplars which the child has previously
experienced. ‘Strong’ representations allow cleaner signaling to the executive
functions mechanisms and memory systems involved in reaching tasks which
require young infants to coordinate motor movement with remembering where
a hidden object is located.
Similar task-dependent results have been found for the acquisition of the
English active transitive construction. That is, English-speaking children have
difficulties producing this construction with a novel verb until around 21/2 years
on average. In preferential-looking studies, however, English-speaking chil-
dren aged 21 months are more likely to look at to the correct video out of
two which have reverse agent and patient roles when they hear a transitive
with a novel causative verb (e.g. Gertner, Fisher and Eisengart, in press). Such
measure-dependent results have also been found within the same task for the
same two-year-olds in ‘weird word order’ studies. That is, when only actual
usage (using grammatical versus ungrammatical orders) was measured, the
28-month-olds in Abbot-Smith et al. (2001)’s study tended to use the novel
verbs in the orders in which they had heard, even if these were ungrammat-
ical. However, these children also often ‘avoided’ using the novel verb they
had heard used ungrammatically; in this condition they were four times much
more likely to describe the action using a noun-only or verb-only utterance or
to select an alternative verb (such as The cow’s doing it) than in the condi-
tion where they had heard the novel verb used grammatically (see also Abbot-
Smith, Lieven, and Tomasello 2005, for similar findings). This indicates that
English 28-month-olds are not willing to use even novel verbs in ungrammati-
cal linking, which would be surprising, if their representations of the transitive
were entirely based around familiar verbs. English children at this age appear
to have a ‘weak’ verb-general representation of the active transitive construc-
tion which allows them to avoid using ungrammatical orders and to look at
the matching picture in preferential-looking, but is not strong enough to assist
them in overcoming the burden of remembering the new word and coordinating
production of a multi-word utterance.
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Supportive evidence for this ‘graded representations’ claim comes from a
connectionist simulation that uses a single mechanism to account for early suc-
cess in looking-time tasks and only later success in production tasks (Chang,
Dell and Bock 2006). The model learns meaning-form mappings during acqui-
sition that are deployed incrementally during the production or processing of a
sentence. The incremental nature of syntax in the model interacts with the way
the tasks are evaluated. In production tasks, a complete transitive sentence is
the dependent measure, while in preferential-looking tasks, children look back
and forth between the two pictures and the percent of preference for the match-
ing picture is the dependent measure. If a child has a weak representation for
one position in the sentence, they might not produce a complete transitive, but
their matching ability at other positions might be enough to yield an overall
matching preference. The model provides a demonstration that this account is
consistent with the developmental production and preferential looking data.
One potential criticism of the ‘graded representations’ account of task-de-
pendent grammatical productivity might be that it is indistinguishable from an
alternative ‘performance limitations’ account. In the latter, some researchers
have argued that one- and two-year-olds show a better performance in looking
tasks because elicited production and act-out tasks are inherently too difficult
for children this age (e.g., Fisher 2002). In addition, Naigles (2002) argues
that one reason why children have performed better in the preferential-looking
studies is that most of these studies have only required children to notice dif-
ferences in form and match this with extremely rough differences in meaning.
The novel verb elicitation studies (and perhaps also the act-out comprehension
studies), on the other hand, might require the child to understand the meaning
of the novel verb more exactly for the child to be able to extend the transitive
frame to it.
A usage-based ‘graded representations’ account would make the following
predictions which would not be made by a ‘performance limitations’ account.
Firstly, we would predict cross-linguistic variation among young two-year-olds
in their elicited production of grammatical constructions depending on the per-
ceptual salience and clarity of form-meaning mapping of the formal cues to
the semantics of the construction concerned. This appears to be the case. In
German, in which case-marking rather than word order is the major deter-
minant of semantic role interpretation, 28-month-olds correct novel verbs to
canonical linking significantly more often than their English age counterparts,
demonstrating more robust verb-general representations of agent- and patient-
marking (e.g., Abbot-Smith et al 2005). The same may even be true of the
act-out task; the poor performance of English children before age 21/2 cannot
be solely due to memory difficulties since Turkish children of the same age
can correctly act out transitive sentences around 80 % of the time at 24 months
(e.g., Slobin and Bever 1982). Secondly, the graded representations account
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would not only predict age effects but also pure exemplar-learning effects. In-
deed, when English-speaking 21/2-year-olds hear a large number of exemplars
of the transitive construction over four days, their performance on novel verb
productivity tests improves significantly (see Childers and Tomasello 2001).
5. Conclusion
In sum, to account for the phenomena of syntactic acquisition we have pro-
posed a hybrid categorization model with instance learning and retention, but
with permanent schema abstraction if this is accessed frequently enough to
categorize new instances. The schema abstraction for syntactic constructions
is based on a combined perceptual categorization of surface form, on the one
hand, and functional-semantic categorization of communicative function, on
the other. The former is constrained by human skills of vocal-auditory infor-
mation processing and statistical learning (e.g., Aslin, Saffran and Newport
1998), whereas the latter is constrained by human skills of intention-reading
and analogy making when parsing utterances.
However, it is abundantly clear that we know very little about how all of
this actually works in practice. There are very few experimental investigations
of the abstraction/generalization process, and its relation to input and input
frequencies of various types, and so there remain many unanswered questions
regarding exactly which elements of events and constructions are most salient
to children in the initial phases of grammar learning and how they use these
to make generalizations. A great deal of research will be required to determine
exactly what features of events and linguistic constructions children find so
similar that they are naturally led to generalize.
Department of Comparative and Developmental Psychology
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
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